How Russia transformed a failed private lender into an institution financing military production, shaping defense-industrial policy and building new pathways for international trade.
On Oct. 1, the U.S. Treasury put A7, a Russian digital finance and payments company, in the same legal category as Japan’s yakuza and the Camorra of Naples, two of the world’s most notorious crime syndicates. Treasury’s announcement and a companion rule tied A7 to hundreds of firms abroad that A7 controls and accused the network of providing financial support to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and to Hamas.
For most banks, having a business partner branded part of an international criminal enterprise would be enough to trigger a crisis. Not so for Promsvyazbank, or PSB, the Russian defense bank that owns 49% of A7. In the fifth year of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine, the state-owned bank of record for the country’s military-industrial complex appears to be launching a new phase of expansion, one set to deepen its role in the war economy even as Moscow’s own borrowing falters. Only a day before Treasury’s announcement, Russia’s Finance Ministry failed to sell bonds at auction. It finished the quarter with 1.26 trillion rubles ($15.2 billion), short of its 1.5 trillion goal. For more on the borrowing gap, see the Frontline Atlas Signal, “Russia Plans to Borrow 2.45 Trillion Rubles by December After a Failed Bond Auction.”
A day after Washington’s action against A7, PSB Chairman Pyotr Fradkov was already discussing ways to accelerate military production with Russian officials and defense-industry leaders. Even as Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FinCEN, proposed barring U.S. financial institutions from handling transactions involving A7’s overseas intermediaries, PSB’s leadership seemed determined to signal that it was undaunted by Western restrictions.
Less than two weeks later, on Oct. 13, Fradkov joined A7 co-owner Ilan Shor to unveil A7 International, a new service promising to let Russian importers pay foreign suppliers in Tether, a dollar-pegged cryptocurrency, with recipients receiving conventional bank transfers using SWIFT, the financial messaging network from which PSB had been excluded after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The advertised commission was just 0.3%.
Two days later, on Oct. 15, Russia’s first deputy prime minister, Denis Manturov, convened the inaugural meeting of A7’s supervisory council. Joining him were Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev, Fradkov and Shor, a Moldovan fugitive serving as A7’s chief executive despite a 15-year prison sentence for fraud and money laundering. Officially an advisory body charged with developing Russia’s international payments infrastructure, the council gave A7 something considerably more valuable than another financial product: political backing from the highest levels of government.
The flurry of announcements was a striking display of confidence from a Russian state-owned bank whose payments venture Washington had just linked to Iranian weapons procurement and Iran’s illicit oil-shipping network. But Fradkov, 48, had reason to feel confident. A Kremlin insider’s insider, he had risen swiftly through Russia’s financial establishment, from a junior posting at Vnesheconombank’s U.S. office in 2000 to the chairmanship of one of the country’s most important state-owned banks.
By May 2026, his name was circulating among officials and bankers as a possible successor to Elvira Nabiullina, Russia’s powerful central bank governor. His father, Mikhail Fradkov, was President Vladimir Putin’s prime minister and then ran the SVR, Russia’s foreign intelligence service, for nine years. His younger brother, Pavel Fradkov, became a deputy defense minister in 2024, which leaves one Fradkov running the bank that processes payments for Russian weapons and the other sitting inside the ministry that orders them.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has proved a boon for Fradkov’s career and PSB’s fortunes. By the end of 2022, the bank’s assets had more than tripled since its state takeover five years earlier, making it Russia’s fifth-largest lender. Three months later, it overtook Alfa-Bank, the country’s largest privately owned bank, climbing to fourth place. Once on the brink of collapse, PSB was now financing everything from military mortgages to Russian-made aircraft, alongside its expanding role in the defense industry. Fradkov was confident enough to assure Putin in January 2023 that PSB could provide cheap, long-term credit to defense manufacturers without additional budget subsidies.

Illustration of Vladimir Putin’s January 2023 meeting with Pyotr Fradkov. Interpretive artwork; see the Kremlin’s official meeting record for documentary photographs.
But three years on, the outlook for PSB looks far less rosy. Since mid-2024, the government has nearly doubled the capital it has put into the bank, to 427.1 billion rubles ($5.2 billion), with most of the increase coming this year. PSB lost 19.2 billion rubles ($232 million) in 2025 after setting aside nearly 300 billion rubles ($3.6 billion) for bad loans. Yet neither the bank’s mounting financial troubles nor Washington’s latest assault on A7 appears to have tempered the Kremlin’s ambitions for PSB.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has placed enormous demands on defense manufacturers already dependent on government contracts and bank financing. Among them is Rostec, the state conglomerate encompassing more than 800 enterprises, including some of Russia’s largest arms producers. In 2018, when PSB received its defense-banking mandate, Rostec reported annual revenue of 1.64 trillion rubles ($26.2 billion at the time), with civilian products accounting for 30%. By 2025, revenue had nearly tripled to more than 4.5 trillion rubles ($54.3 billion), while the civilian share had fallen to roughly a quarter.
Before the invasion, Rostec had been under pressure to diversify into civilian production. Now its military business was growing much faster. Yet the surge in business brought new financial pressures. Rostec’s profits fell 42% in 2025, and its chief executive, Sergei Chemezov, acknowledged that the company lacked sufficient funds to finance new investment projects.
The Kremlin has nonetheless succeeded so far in papering over the troubles roiling defense-industry financing. As Moscow has reoriented the Russian economy around military production, PSB has undergone a makeover of its own. In April 2025, Promsvyazbank formally became Bank PSB and moved its registered headquarters from Moscow to Yaroslavl. A new advertising campaign enlisted Viktor Khorinyak, star of the fantasy franchise “The Last Warrior,” to rescue pensioners from scammers under the slogan “Bank of a Strong Country.”
PSB’s glow-up also comes at a curious moment in Washington’s dealings with Moscow. On Oct. 27, The New York Times reported that the Trump administration was considering lifting sanctions on the Russian Direct Investment Fund, a Kremlin-controlled investment vehicle that the U.S. Treasury had once described as a slush fund for Putin. The talks were tied to a deal to bring Russian diesel back onto American and international markets, despite a 2022 congressional ban on imports of Russian petroleum products.
The prospect of sanctions relief for the fund raises awkward questions about Washington’s wider policy toward Russian finance. Weeks after Treasury took aim at A7’s payments network, the administration was weighing whether to restore another Kremlin-backed institution’s access to the international financial system. For PSB, the stakes could be considerable.
According to a FinCEN alert and a proposed rule issued Oct. 1, A7 controls a web of hundreds of companies abroad with bank accounts at some 435 financial institutions in at least 83 countries. The network gives Russian clients a way back into the international banking system after several sanctioned Russian banks, PSB among them, were removed from SWIFT in March 2022. Its intermediaries are typically presented as owned or run by non-Russians, but A7 ultimately controls them, and its staff run their bank accounts and move money among them, allowing Russian customers to pay overseas suppliers without disclosing their involvement.
FinCEN said Iranian actors, including the Central Bank of Iran and the Revolutionary Guard, have used the network, and that it has become a conduit for illicit activity linked to North Korea. The agency estimated that the companies processed more than $17 billion in dollar-denominated transactions between January 2025 and June 2026.
The proposed restrictions remain subject to public comment until Nov. 4, with no deadline for a final decision. But the regulatory filing contains a revealing detail absent from Treasury’s announcement. Although the press release named Shor as A7’s leader, it did not mention PSB. FinCEN’s proposal does. It explicitly identifies the Russian state-owned defense bank as a founding force behind the A7 Network and includes PSB among the entities that constitute it.
Treasury’s action followed months of investigative reporting that revealed the shadowy underside of A7’s operations. Independent researcher Zachary Tvarozna, who writes the Substack newsletter Evidence of Absence, had examined leaked A7 communications describing foreign accounts and payment intermediaries. In September, the Financial Times traced more than $6.9 billion in payments through international banks, documenting front companies and fabricated trade paperwork; its reporting also identified more than $2 billion in foreign-currency earnings linked to Rosneft, Russia’s state oil company, passing through the network. More recently, an investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and the Russian investigative outlet Proekt traced billions of dollars’ worth of rubles in cash through A7’s payment operation and into accounts at PSB. These records show an operational banking relationship. They do not show a direct payment chain from weapons manufacturers financed by PSB to foreign suppliers. Frontline Atlas has previously examined A7’s links to USDKG, a Kyrgyz dollar token, and questioned how much of the trading in A7A5, A7’s ruble-pegged token, reflects real commerce.
In Moscow, Fradkov had another set of financial problems to solve. The Kremlin was pressing defense manufacturers to turn out more weapons, even as sanctions complicated payments to foreign suppliers. Besides the finance and energy ministers, the council’s first meeting drew a deputy director of Rosgvardiya, the country’s National Guard, and the head of Rossotrudnichestvo, its international cultural outreach agency. A payments business that Washington had just branded a transnational criminal organization was attracting the attention of some unlikely corners of the Russian state.

Denis Manturov, Russia’s first deputy prime minister and chair of A7’s new supervisory council. Source: The Russian Government.
The most consequential figure on A7’s new council was Manturov. Much like Fradkov, he comes from a storied family with close ties to Kremlin insiders. His father, Valentin, served in government during the Soviet era and in 2017 owned half of a financial company whose other half belonged to Stanislav Chemezov, the eldest son of Rostec’s chief executive. Manturov spent 12 years as minister of industry and trade, taking on a deputy prime minister’s portfolio for the defense industry in 2022 before Putin promoted him to first deputy prime minister in 2024.
The presence of the finance and energy ministers signaled the Kremlin’s determination to smooth import-export financing. For a company whose overseas intermediaries had just come under American scrutiny, the gathering was an impressive display of political support, though the council has no publicly disclosed authority to direct transactions or commit government funds.
But Manturov’s involvement suggests that Moscow increasingly regards access to international payments as part of the challenge of sustaining its war economy. Ukrainian attacks on oil infrastructure, mounting pressure on government finances and the demands of military production have left the Kremlin with little room for bureaucratic disconnects and administrative complacency. Fradkov’s job is becoming more complicated just as PSB’s responsibilities expand.
Washington, meanwhile, appears to be heading in another direction. On Oct. 16, President Donald Trump waived most of the new sanctions and tariffs authorized under the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, which he had signed less than a month earlier. A week before, Treasury had authorized certain transactions involving Russian diesel, including imports into the United States, drawing objections from lawmakers. Neither measure lifted existing sanctions against PSB or A7. Nor is there evidence that either has yet eased Russia’s military-financing pressures.
Moscow, for its part, is reinforcing PSB’s capacity and rallying the country’s economic leaders behind A7. PSB has received four capital injections this year totaling about 148 billion rubles ($1.8 billion), according to figures examined by the KSE Institute, the research arm of the Kyiv School of Economics. Russian budget documents examined by RBC, a Moscow business news outlet, show that in September 2025 the government planned to add 29.6 billion rubles ($357 million) to PSB’s capital, nearly all of it so the bank could meet capital requirements on loans made at Putin’s instruction. The rest was to cover the risk on defense loans PSB was taking over from other Russian banks. The documents do not establish which borrowers ultimately benefited or whether the money covered losses on particular defense loans. A year on, Russia’s budget remains under strain.
On Oct. 1, the government raised its forecast for this year’s federal deficit to 7.34 trillion rubles ($88.6 billion), nearly twice the 3.8 trillion it had originally planned. After a six-week pause in its bond auctions, the main way the government borrows at home, the Finance Ministry sold 1 trillion rubles ($12.1 billion) of bonds on Sept. 2. The 12 banks the central bank designates as systemically important, which together hold about 80% of Russia’s banking assets, bought 83.6% of the issue, according to the central bank. KSE reported that the buyers then pledged nearly all of the bonds to the central bank as collateral for short-term loans. It called the arrangement indirect monetary financing, a roundabout way of funding the budget with central bank money, while cautioning that the flows did not match one for one. An auction on Sept. 30 failed. Moscow plans to raise another 2.45 trillion rubles ($29.6 billion) at auction in the fourth quarter.
Laura Solanko, an economist at the Bank of Finland’s Institute for Emerging Economies, found that PSB accounted for 7% of the bonds held by Russian banks at the end of 2025, across all bond types; no public data identify its purchases in the September auction. Neither Solanko nor KSE concluded that Russia was about to lose the capacity to finance its war. Indeed, if the bank’s early history is any guide, PSB may just be too toxic to fail, and that is part of its design.
To understand how PSB became so central to Russia’s war economy, it helps to return to an earlier confrontation over American sanctions and a banking crisis that gave the Kremlin an unexpected opportunity. Brothers Dmitry and Alexei Ananyev founded Promsvyazbank in 1995 and built it into one of Russia’s largest private lenders. On Dec. 15, 2017, Russia’s central bank took over the financially distressed lender, then the country’s ninth-largest. The brothers lost control of the business they had developed over two decades.
The timing was consequential. Four months earlier, on Aug. 2, Trump had signed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, a law designed to tighten sanctions on Russia and limit the president’s power to lift them. One provision, taking effect in January 2018, threatened sanctions against anyone conducting significant transactions with Russia’s defense and intelligence sectors.
Banks were already responding. In December, Alfa-Bank announced that it was withdrawing from business with defense manufacturers over American sanctions concerns. Russian officials were preparing to concentrate Defense Ministry procurement financing and weapons-industry banking in one state-controlled institution, according to a February 2018 assessment by Poland’s Centre for Eastern Studies. There is no established evidence the Kremlin engineered PSB’s collapse in response to the new law. Its financial problems were real, and the Ananyevs contested the takeover. But Moscow soon found a strategic use for the rescued bank: it could serve sensitive defense clients while other lenders limited their exposure.
In 2018, the government designated PSB as a specialized bank for the defense industry and appointed Fradkov chairman. Russia was embarking on another decade-long military modernization program. In November 2017, Deputy Defense Minister Tatyana Shevtsova had announced plans to spend 20 trillion rubles (about $330 billion at the time) through 2027, 19 trillion of it for weapons and military equipment.
Weapons manufacturers needed the special accounts Russian law requires for state weapons contracts, along with payments, loans and guarantees. They also carried debts from earlier modernization programs, which had relied on bank credit to bridge the gap between production and government payments. PSB could bring those services together in a lender that Moscow did not expect to keep ordinary access to Western markets.
In 2020, Fradkov told Putin the bank had opened more than 600 billion rubles in credit lines and guarantees for defense companies, with about 430 billion already used. When he met Putin again in May 2025, he said PSB serviced every state weapons contract that Russian law requires a bank to oversee. Four-fifths of the defense loans it had issued carried preferential annual rates of about 5% to 5.5%, he said, at a time when the central bank’s benchmark rate stood at 21%. Overseeing the accounts for weapons contracts does not mean financing every contract. But handling the payments while extending cheap credit gave PSB an unusually extensive presence in the industry.
The Ananyevs’ legal troubles, meanwhile, continued. On Aug. 18, a Moscow court convicted the brothers in absentia of embezzling more than 39 billion rubles ($470 million) from PSB between 2012 and 2017 and sentenced each to eight years in prison. Both hold Cypriot citizenship, and a lawyer for Alexei Ananyev said she would appeal.
The Ananyevs’ convictions were an awkward reminder of the bank's origins, but hardly the most pressing question about its future. PSB has gone from a troubled family-owned lender to the Kremlin’s indispensable war financier, with a payments partner Washington now considers a criminal enterprise. In Russia’s financial system, it seems, the family business has acquired some powerful new relations.